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CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE
Aaron J. Campbell *
Kathleen B. Martin **
I. INTRODUCTION
This article aims to give the criminal law practitioner a suc-
cinct review of significant cases regarding criminal law and pro-
cedure decided by the Supreme Court of Virginia and the Court of
Appeals of Virginia during the past year. The authors have fo-
cused their discussion of the cases on cogent points found in the
holdings. The article also briefly summarizes recent legislative
enactments pertaining to criminal law.
II. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
A. Trial
1. Cross- Examination
In Cortez-Hernandez v. Commonwealth, the defendant failed to
proffer the questions-and the expected answers-he would have
asked a prosecution witness on requested re-cross-examination. 1
This failure defeated his claim that the trial court had erred in
not allowing him to re-cross-examine the witness after the Com-
monwealth elicited new information on its re-direct-examination.2
The Court of Appeals of Virginia assumed the trial court erred in
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1. 58 Va. App. 66, 75, 706 S.E.2d 893, 898 afrd en banc, 59 Va. App. 37, 716 S.E.2d
484 (2011).
2. Id.
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prohibiting the defense from conducting re-cross-examination,
but it could not determine whether the error was reversible be-
cause there had been no proffer nor a showing that the trial court
had not allowed a proffer.3 The court further held that the de-
fendant had not preserved for appeal any argument that his Sixth
Amendment right to confrontation had been violated.4
2. Insanity Defense for Juvenile
A juvenile has no right to assert an insanity defense in a delin-
quency proceeding.5 However, a juvenile fourteen years of age or
older, who has been charged with an offense that would be pun-
ished by incarceration in a state correctional facility if committed
by an adult, may elect to have his case transferred from the juve-
nile court to the circuit court for trial as an adult. The juvenile
then would have a statutory right to an insanity defense.7
In D.L.G. v. Commonwealth, the fifteen-year-old defendant
chose to have his case heard in the juvenile court, which found
him competent to stand trial, adjudicated him delinquent, and
committed him to the custody of the Department of Juvenile Jus-
tice.8 The defendant noted a de novo appeal to the circuit court
and then requested a psychiatric evaluation to determine his san-
ity at the time of the offense, asserting that he had a constitu-
tional right to the exam in the circuit court.9 The trial court de-
nied his motion.0
On appeal to the Court of Appeals of Virginia, the defendant
contended that the circuit court's ruling violated his equal protec-
3. Id. at 77-79, 706 S.E.2d at 899-900. The court of appeals also noted the defendant
had not re-called the witness during his own case-in-chief. Id. at 79, 706 S.E.2d at 900.
4. Id. The dissent believed that the defendant preserved his Sixth Amendment claim
and that the trial court's error, in limiting the defendant's right of cross-examination, was
not harmless. Id. at 86-88, 706 S.E.2d at 903-05 (Haley, J., dissenting).
5. See Commonwealth v. Chatman, 260 Va. 562, 564-65, 538 S.E.2d 304, 304-05
(2000).
6. See VA. CODE ANN. §§ 16.1-270, -272(A) (Repl. Vol. 2010).
7. See VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-168 (Repl. Vol. 2008).
8. 60 Va. App. 77, 79-80, 724 S.E.2d 208, 209-10 (2012), petition for appeal filed, No.
120884 (Va. May 25, 2012). The defendant admitted he had poured bleach into his moth-
er's tea and told the investigating police officer he had been "bearing voices and feeling
homicidal." Id. at 79, 724 S.E.2d at 209.
9. Id. at 80, 724 S.E.2d at 210.
10. Id.
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tion rights under the Fourteenth Amendment." The court of ap-
peals disagreed, noting that "age is not a suspect classification
under the Equal Protection Clause" and that there is "no funda-
mental right" in the Constitution to plead guilty by reason of in-
sanity.'" The court held that because the defendant chose not to
be tried initially as an adult in circuit court, thereby availing
himself of an insanity defense, his equal protection rights had not
been violated."
3. Juror Related to Witness
In Mayfield v. Commonwealth, the Court of Appeals of Virginia
declined to adopt the defendant's suggested rule that a prospec-
tive juror who is related to a witness is per se disqualified from
serving as a juror.'4 During voir dire, a member of Mayfield's jury
panel stated that one of the Commonwealth's witnesses was her
nephew and another witness was the daughter of her cousin."
The juror said her family relationship would not be "a problem in
deciding the case," as she had not talked with the individuals
about their knowledge of the crime, could disregard her relation-
ship with them, and could evaluate their testimony impartially
without regard to any preconceived thoughts about their truth-
fulness.'6 The trial court denied the defendant's motion to strike
the juror for cause, and defense counsel subsequently used a per-
emptory strike to remove her.'
7
On appeal to the Court of Appeals of Virginia, Mayfield argued
the juror should have been struck for cause, as her family rela-
tionship with the witnesses compromised her ability to be impar-
tial and adversely affected public confidence in the judicial sys-
tem.'" The court of appeals held the juror's status, by itself, did
11. id. at 81, 724 S.E.2d at 210.
12. id, at 83, 724 S.E.2d at 212.
13. Id., 724 S.E.2d at 211-12.
14. 59 Va. App. 839, 845 & n.2, 722 S.E.2d 689, 692, 693 n.2 (2012). The court of ap-
peals noted that while other states have adopted a similar per se rule, the Supreme Court
of Virginia has "expressly rejected' such a rule. Id. at 845 n.2, 722 S.E.2d at 693 n.2 (citing
Townsend v. Commonwealth, 270 Va. 325, 331, 619 S.E.2d 71, 74-75 (2005); Barrett v.
Commonwealth, 262 Va. 823, 826, 553 S.E.2d 731, 733 (2001)).
15. Id. at 842, 722 S.E.2d at 691.
16. Id. at 842-43, 722 S.E.2d at 691.
17. Id. at 843, 722 S.E.2d at 692.
18. Id. at 847, 722 S.E.2d at 693-94.
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not warrant removing her for cause. 9 However, the court did not
address the public confidence argument because Mayfield had not
made that argument in the trial court.° Mayfield's argument at
trial-that the juror was biased-was not sufficient to preserve
the separate public confidence argument."
4. Nolle Prosequi
In Duggins v. Commonwealth, the Court of Appeals of Virginia
held a defendant may not challenge at trial the ruling of a court
in an earlier trial that permitted the Commonwealth to nolle
prosequi identical indictments.22 In Duggins's first trial, the
Commonwealth moved to nolle prosequi charges after the trial
court denied the Commonwealth's motion for a continuance to se-
cure an essential witness." On appeal following his second trial,
Duggins argued the court lacked authority to try him on the new
indictments because the court erroneously had granted the Com-
monwealth's nolle prosequi motion.24 The court of appeals held
that a nolle prosequi releases a defendant from liability on an in-
dictment but does not acquit him of the charge. 5 Thus, a nolle
prosequi cannot be reconsidered or collaterally attacked after it
becomes final.26
5. Unavailable Witness
The issue of witness unavailability was addressed in Turner v.
Commonwealth.7 Turner was charged with aggravated malicious
wounding and use of a firearm during an aggravated malicious
wounding, stemming from an altercation involving several high
school football players. 8 One of the victim's friends, Poindexter,
19. Id. at 848, 722 S.E.2d at 694.
20. Id. at 847, 722 S.E.2d at 694.
21. Id., 722 S.E.2d at 693.
22. 59 Va. App. 785, 794, 722 S.E.2d 663, 667 (2012), petition for app. filed, No.
120682 (Va. Apr. 23, 2012)).
23. Id. at 788-89, 722 S.E.2d at 665.
24. Id. at 789-90, 722 S.E.2d at 665.
25. Id. at 791-92, 722 S.E.2d at 666 (quoting Miller v. Commonwealth, 217 Va. 929,
935, 234 S.E.2d 269, 273 (1977); Lindsay v. Commonwealth, 4 Va. (2 Va. Cas.) 345, 347
(1823)).
26. Id. at 792-93, 722 S.E.2d at 667.
27. 284 Va. 201, 201, 726 S.E.2d 325, 327 (2012).
28. Id.
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identified Turner at the preliminary hearing as the person who
shot the victim but then testified at trial that he did not see any-
one with a gun and did not see Turner in the area on the night of
the offense.29 The prosecutor unsuccessfully attempted to refresh
Poindexter's memory by having him review the preliminary hear-
ing transcript. 0 After the trial court sustained the defendant's ob-
jection to admitting the transcript into evidence because it was
not properly certified by the court reporter, the Commonwealth
called as a witness the attorney who previously represented
Turner at the preliminary hearing.3 ' Over the defendant's objec-
tion, the attorney related the substance of Poindexter's prelimi-
nary hearing testimony.32
On appeal to the Court of Appeals of Virginia, Turner contend-
ed that the trial court erroneously admitted the attorney's testi-
mony because Poindexter was not an unavailable witness, that
the attorney had a continuing duty of loyalty to Turner even
though he no longer represented him, that the attorney's testi-
mony regarding Poindexter's testimony was inadmissible hear-
say, and that the attorney had not independently recalled the tes-
timony but instead had refreshed his memory by reviewing the
inadmissible transcript.33 In affirming the trial court's ruling, the
court of appeals held that Poindexter was an unavailable witness
even though he was present at trial because his lack of memory of
the shooting made his testimony unavailable. 4 The court con-
cluded that the testimony of Turner's former attorney was not an
ethical violation because the information to which he testified be-
came public at the preliminary hearing and did not concern any
privileged communication from Turner.35
The Supreme Court of Virginia, however, reversed the judg-
ment of the court of appeals, vacated Turner's convictions, and
remanded the case for a new trial.36 The supreme court held that
the trial court abused its discretion in finding Poindexter to be an
unavailable witness because the court failed to determine, as re-
29. Id. at 204-05, 726 S.E.2d at 328-29.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 205, 726 S.E.2d at 329.
32. Id. at 205-06, 726 S.E.2d at 329.
33. Turner v. Commonwealth, 58 Va. App. 567, 578-79, 712 S.E.2d 28, 33-34 (2011).
34. Id. at 583-84, 712 S.E.2d at 36.
35. Id. at 590-91, 712 S.E.2d at 39-40.
36. Turner, 284 Va. at 209, 726 S.E.2d at 331.
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quired by Sapp v. Commonwealth,7 whether his claimed loss of
memory was bona fide or merely an attempt to avoid testifying at
Turner's trial.8 The supreme court further held the error was not
harmless because the "inconsistent testimony" of the other wit-
ness who said he saw Turner shoot the victim was "not over-
whelming evidence of Turner's guilt" and because the testimony
of Turner's former attorney, which was erroneously allowed be-
cause Poindexter was not unavailable, may have substantially in-
fluenced the verdict.39
6. Venue
Undercover police officers posing as children on the Internet to
attract potential predators are not always located in the same ju-
risdiction as the predators with whom they communicate. In
Spiker v. Commonwealth, a detective in the Louisa County Sher-
iffs Office chatted via a computer system with the defendant,
who was located in Henrico County.40 Charged with violating Vir-
ginia Code section 18.2-374.3, Spiker contended at trial and on
appeal that venue was not proper in Louisa County because he
committed the offense in Henrico County when he sent the elec-
tronic messages. 41 In a case of first impression, the Court of Ap-
peals of Virginia held venue was proper in Louisa County because
the offense was not complete until the messages were received by
the undercover officer in Louisa.42
37. 263 Va. 415, 427, 559 S.E.2d 645, 651 (2002).
38. Turner, 284 Va. at 208, 726 S.E.2d at 330-31. The supreme court noted the trial
court questioned two other witnesses about their alleged inability to recall details of the
offense, although the Commonwealth did not request that they be declared unavailable.
Id. at 208 n.2, 726 S.E.2d at 331 n.2.
39. Id. at 209, 726 S.E.2d at 331. The majority opinion concluded it was unnecessary
to address whether Turner's former attorney violated any rules of professional conduct,
id., but Justice Lemons issued a concurring opinion in which he stated the attorney had
violated Rule 1.9 of the Virginia Rules of Professional Conduct because the information
about which he testified was not "generally known" by the public at large, as contemplated
by the language of Rule 1.9. Id. at 212-13, 726 S.E.2d at 333 (Lemons, J., concurring).
40. 58 Va. App. 466, 467-68, 711 S.E.2d 228, 228-29 (2011).
41. Id. at 468-69, 711 S.E.2d at 229.
42. Id. at 469, 471, 711 S.E.2d at 229-30. The general venue statute, Virginia Code
section 19.2-244, applies to prosecutions under Virginia Code section 18.2-374.3 and re-
quires that a defendant be tried where the offense occurred. See id. at 470, 711 S.E.2d at
229-30 (citations omitted). The Commonwealth's evidence must establish a "strong pre-
sumption" of where the offense occurred, but venue need not be proved beyond a reasona-
ble doubt because it is not a substantive element of the crime. See Cheng v. Common-
wealth, 240 Va. 26, 36, 393 S.E.2d 599, 604 (1990) (citations omitted); Morris v.
[Vol. 47:143
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7. Withdrawal of Guilty Plea
The Court of Appeals of Virginia held in Hubbard v. Common-
wealth that the trial court applied the wrong standard in denying
Hubbard's motion to withdraw his guilty plea.43 Hubbard pled
guilty to the first-degree murder of his estranged wife but moved
to withdraw his plea prior to sentencing.44 As grounds for his mo-
tion, he stated that he had not acted with premeditation and that
his attorneys had pressured him to plead guilty.0 The trial court
denied the motion because Hubbard had been represented by "ex-
perienced attorneys" and the guilty plea questionnaire showed
that he had been "properly informed" about his plea.4" The trial
court surmised that Hubbard was simply unhappy with the pun-
ishment he faced.47
The court of appeals held that the appropriate standard for de-
termining whether a defendant should be permitted to withdraw
his guilty plea was set forth in Parris v. Commonwealth and reaf-
firmed in Bottoms v. Commonwealth."5 Accordingly, in Hubbard's
case, the trial court erred because Hubbard's defense was reason-
able and not formal or dilatory." Whether the proffered defense is
reasonable is based not on the likelihood the factfinder would ac-
cept it but on whether it "is one that the law would recognize as
such if the factfinder found credible the facts supporting it.""
In Williams v. Commonwealth, however, the defendant provid-
ed insufficient grounds to withdraw his guilty plea."1 Williams en-
tered an Alford plea 2 to a charge of abduction with intent to de-
Commonwealth, 51 Va. App. 459, 469, 658 S.E.2d 708, 712-13 (2008) (citations omitted).
43. 60 Va. App. 200, 212, 725 S.E.2d 163, 169 (2012).
44. Id. at 203-04, 725 S.E.2d at 164-65.
45. Id. at 205, 725 S.E.2d at 165. Both of Hubbard's trial attorneys withdrew from the
case after he filed his motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Id. at 204-05, 725 S.E.2d at 165
(footnote omitted).
46. Id. at 205, 725 S.E.2d at 165.
47. Id. at 206, 725 S.E.2d at 166.
48. Id. at 207, 212, 725 S.E.2d at 166, 169 (citing Bottoms v. Commonwealth, 281 Va.
23, 34, 704 S.E.2d 406, 412 (2011); Parris v. Commonwealth, 189 Va. 321, 325-26, 52
S.E.2d 872, 874 (1949)). The standard requires the defendant to show he has a reasonable
defense and is making his motion in good faith, rather than as a dilatory tactic. Id. at 207-
08, 725 S.E.2d at 166 (citation omitted).
49. Id. at 210, 725 S.E.2d at 168.
50. Id., 725 S.E.2d at 167-68.
51. 59 Va. App. 238, 249-50, 717 S.E.2d 837, 842 (2011).
52. See North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 37 (1970) (holding that a defendant may
20121
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file, understanding that he would receive an active prison sen-
tence of fifteen years to be served concurrently with his sentence
on an unrelated case. 3 Before he was sentenced, however, he
moved to withdraw his plea, asserting that he had been dis-
tressed by the harsh sentence given in his other case and that the
victim's testimony was not credible."4 The Court of Appeals of Vir-
ginia held there was no merit to the defendant's claim-that he
feared he might receive another life sentence-because he knew
before entering his plea "exactly" what his sentence would be un-
der the plea agreement." The court also held that the defendant's
challenge to the victim's credibility was not a reasonable de-
fense. 6
B. Sentencing
1. Deferred Disposition
The Virginia appellate courts addressed several issues regard-
ing the authority of trial courts in sentencing criminal defend-
ants. The Supreme Court of Virginia held in Burrell v. Common-
wealth that a sentencing order provision, which stated the
defendant's charge would be reduced from attempted rape to mis-
demeanor assault and battery upon his successfully completing
five years of probation, was void ab initio."7 Burrell initially was
sentenced pursuant to a plea agreement; he then moved to vacate
the sentencing order after he was charged with violating his pro-
bation. 8 He argued that the sentencing order was void because
the trial court had no authority to alter the conviction once twen-
ty-one days had passed after entry of the final judgment. The
circuit court ruled that the sentencing order was not a final order,
properly plead guilty without admitting to participation in the crime).
53. Williams, 59 Va. App. at 240-41, 717 S.E.2d at 838.
54. Id. at 244-45, 717 S.E.2d at 839-40.
55. Id. at 248, 717 S.E.2d at 841-42.
56. Id. at 249, 717 S.E.2d at 842.
57. 283 Va. 474, 477, 480, 722 S.E.2d 272, 273, 275 (2012).
58. Id. at 477, 722 S.E.2d at 273.
59. Id.
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that Virginia Code section 19.2-303 conferred jurisdiction to re-
duce the offense, and that Burrell, having taken advantage of the
plea agreement, could not later seek to overturn it.60
The supreme court disagreed with all three rulings. The court
determined the order was final because it "adjudicated guilt, im-
posed a sentence, remanded Burrell to the custody of the sheriff,
and required that Burrell register as a sex offender upon his re-
lease from incarceration." Importantly, the order did not state
specifically that the court retained jurisdiction to reconsider the
conviction or sentence. 62 The supreme court further held that sec-
tion 19.2-303 permitted the trial court to modify only the un-
served portion of a sentence and that the invited error doctrine
did not apply because the entire sentencing order was void ab ini-
tio." The court remanded the case for reconsideration of sentenc-
ing.64
In Taylor v. Commonwealth, the defendant asserted that the
trial court, after having found the evidence sufficient to prove
Taylor committed grand larceny, had inherent authority to re-
duce the charge to petit larceny, based on mitigating evidence
Taylor presented at the sentencing hearing.5 The Court of Ap-
peals of Virginia held that the trial court had no constitutional,
statutory, or inherent common law authority to acquit Taylor of
grand larceny. 6 "[A] Virginia court cannot refuse to convict a
guilty defendant merely because it questions the category of of-
fense assigned by the legislature, considers the range of statutory
punishment too harsh, or believes certain guilty offenders unde-
serving of a criminal conviction." 7
Similarly, in Epps v. Commonwealth, the Court of Appeals of
Virginia rejected the defendant's argument that the trial court
had authority to suspend imposition of sentence upon certain
conditions and to later vacate the defendant's conviction if he sat-
60. Id.
61. Id. at 478, 722 S.E.2d at 274.
62. Id., 722 S.E.2d at 273-74 (quoting In re Commonwealth of Va. Dep't of Corr., 222
Va. 454, 464, 281 S.E.2d 857, 863 (1981)).
63. Id. at 479-81, 722 S.E.2d at 274-75.
64. Id. at 481, 722 S.E.2d at 275.
65. 58 Va. App. 435, 439, 710 S.E.2d 518, 520 (2011) (citation omitted).
66. Id., 710 S.E.2d at 520.
67. Id. at 442, 710 S.E.2d at 521.
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isfactorily complied with the conditions. 8 Epps pled guilty to pos-
session of cocaine, but before he was sentenced, he was convicted
of possession of marijuana, which made him ineligible for a de-
ferred disposition as a first-time drug offender.6 9 However, he
asked the trial court to suspend imposition of sentence on the co-
caine conviction under Virginia Code section 19.2-303."0 The trial
court declined to do so."
On appeal, the Court of Appeals of Virginia held that nothing
in section 19.2-303 authorized the relief Epps sought . The court
distinguished section 19.2-303 from other specific Virginia Code
sections in which a defendant may avoid conviction upon compli-
ance with certain conditions." The court ruled that interpreting
section 19.2-303 as Epps suggested would amount to "an act of
judicial clemency," which had not been permitted under the com-
mon law and was not authorized by statute. 4 The court also de-
termined that the defendant's reliance on Hernandez v. Com-
monwealth was misplaced because Hernandez did not answer
"the question whether a court may defer judgment and continue a
case with a promise of a particular disposition at a later date."7
68. 59 Va. App. 71, 74, 717 S.E.2d 151, 152 (2011).
69. Id. at 74-75 & nn.1 & 3, 717 S.E.2d at 152-53 & nn.1 & 3; see VA. CODE ANN. §
18.2-251 (Repl. Vol. 2009 & Cum. Supp. 2012).
70. Epps, 59 Va. App. at 75-76, 717 S.E.2d at 153 (footnote omitted). Virginia Code
section 19.2-303 permits a trial court to suspend imposition of sentence after conviction in
whole or in part and to "place the defendant on probation under such conditions as the
court shall determine." VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-303 (Cum. Supp. 2012). If the defendant vio-
lates the conditions, the trial court may revoke the suspension and sentence the defendant
to whatever term might have been imposed originally. Id. § 19.2-306(C) (Repl. Vol. 2008).
71. Epps, 59 Va. App. at 75-76, 717 S.E.2d at 153.
72. Id. at 81, 717 S.E.2d at 156.
73. Id. at 80-81, 717 S.E.2d at 155-56 (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-57.3 (Repl. Vol.
2009) (domestic assault and battery); id. § 18.2-251 (Cum. Supp. 2012) (applying to illegal
drug possession); id. § 19.2-303.2 (Repl. Vol. 2008) (applying to misdemeanor property of-
fenses)).
74. Id. at 83-84 & n.9, 717 S.E.2d at 157 & n.9 (quoting Richardson v. Common-
wealth, 131 Va. 802, 809, 109 S.E. 460, 462 (1921)).
75. Id. at 82, 717 S.E.2d at 156 (quoting Hernandez v. Commonwealth, 281 Va. 222,
225, 707 S.E.2d 273, 274 (2011)) (internal quotation marks omitted). In Hernandez, the
Supreme Court of Virginia held that a trial court had discretionary authority to continue a
case on its docket for future disposition, subject to conditions ordered by the court. 281 Va.
at 226, 707 S.E.2d at 275.
[Vol. 47:143
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2. Mandatory Minimum Sentence
In Hines v. Commonwealth, the Court of Appeals of Virginia
construed the meaning of a mandatory minimum sentence in
connection with Virginia Code section 18.2-53.1, which proscribes
the use or display of a firearm while committing or attempting to
commit certain felonies.6 The former version of the statute im-
posed a "fixed' prison term of three years for a first offense and
five years for a subsequent offense, and it provided that the sen-
tence could not be suspended in whole or in part." The General
Assembly amended the statute in 2004, fixing the sentence at a
"mandatory minimum term" of three or five years." Because sec-
tion 18.2-53.1 does not contain a sentencing range or a class spec-
ification, which would set forth a maximum penalty for the of-
fense, the issue in Hines was whether the trial court could impose
a prison sentence in excess of three years.79 The trial court sen-
tenced Hines to ten years in prison, with seven years suspended.'
Noting that "[a] minimum sets a sentencing floor, not a ceil-
ing," the court of appeals posited that the absence of a stated
maximum punishment meant a trial court could impose up to a
life sentence for use of a firearm in the commission of a concomi-
tant felony.8' The court further observed, however, that under
Virginia Code section 18.2-14, "the mandatory minimum is the
maximum as well." 2 After reviewing the legislative history of the
applicable statutes, the panel majority concluded that the trial
court erred in imposing a sentence of more than three years.83 The
76. 59 Va. App. 567, 570-71,721 S.E.2d 792, 793 (2012).
77. Id. at 583, 721 S.E.2d at 799 (Kelsey, J. dissenting).
78. Act of April 12, 2004, ch. 461, 2004 Va. Acts 673 (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 18.2-53.1 (Repl. Vol. 2009 & Cum. Supp. 2012)). The legislature defined the phrase
"mandatory minimum" as the "impos[ition of] the entire term of confimement, the full
amount of the fine and the complete requirement of community service prescribed by law,"
such that the punishment shall not be suspended in full or in part. Act of Apr. 12, 2004,
ch. 461, 2004 Va. Acts 673, 674 (codified as amended at VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-12.1 (Repl.
Vol. 2009 & Cum. Supp. 2012)).
79. Hines, 59 Va. App. at 573, 721 S.E.2d at 794.
80. Id. at 571, 721 S.E.2d at 794 (footnote omitted).
81. Id. at 575-76, 721 S.E.2d at 796.
82. Id. at 575, 721 S.E.2d at 796. Virginia Code section 18.2-14 states that where the
class of the offense is not specified, the offense "shall be punished according to the pun-
ishment prescribed in the section... defining the offense." VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-14 (Repl.
Vol. 2009 & Cum. Supp. 2012).
83. Hines, 59 Va. App. at 576-80, 721 S.E.2d at 796-98. The court held the excess
20121
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dissent opined, however, that the plain language of section 18.2-
53.1 set only a mandatory minimum sentence and, thus, the trial
court had discretion to impose the maximum sentence it deemed
appropriate.84
3. Revocation of Suspended Sentence
The Court of Appeals of Virginia held in Downey v. Common-
wealth that Downey's uncorroborated statement to her probation
officer that she had consumed alcohol was sufficient proof she had
violated the terms of her suspended sentence." Downey had ar-
gued "some slight corroboration" was needed because the proba-
tion revocation hearing was akin to a criminal trial in which the
corpus delicti could not be established solely by her statement.6
The court of appeals ruled, however, a revocation hearing was not
a criminal prosecution in which "formal procedures and rules of
evidence" applied. 7 A hearing at which a trial court considers
whether to revoke a probationer's suspended sentence is not a
trial to determine whether a defendant has committed a new
criminal offense and, thus, the alleged violation "need not be
proven beyond a reasonable doubt."8
C. Appeal
1. Abatement Doctrine
In a case of first impression, Bevel v. Commonwealth, the Su-
preme Court of Virginia considered whether a criminal conviction
should abate ab initio, or merely be dismissed, when the defend-
ant dies while his case is pending on appeal.88 Bevel was convicted
of having sexual relations with his minor daughter, and he died
while his petition for appeal was pending in the Court of Appeals
sentence invalid and remanded the case with instructions to impose a three-year sentence.
Id. at 580-81 & n.7, 721 S.E.2d at 798 & n.7.
84. Id. at 593, 721 S.E.2d at 804 (Kelsey, J., dissenting).
85. 59 Va. App. 13, 22, 716 S.E.2d 472, 476 (2011).
86. Id. at 17, 19, 716 S.E.2d at 474-75.
87. Id. at 20, 716 S.E.2d at 475 (quoting Davis v. Commonwealth, 12 Va. App. 81, 84,
402 S.E.2d 684, 686 (1991)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
88. Id. at 21, 716 S.E.2d at 476 (quoting Slayton v. Commonwealth, 185 Va. 357, 366,
38 S.E.2d 479, 483 (1946) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
89. 282 Va. 468, 470, 717 S.E.2d 789, 789 (2011).
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of Virginia.9" When Bevel's attorney moved to abate the conviction
ab initio, the court of appeals remanded the case to the circuit
court to determine whether good cause existed to abate." At the
subsequent hearing, the victim objected to the abatement, and
the circuit court concluded the conviction should stand.92 The
court of appeals affirmed the circuit court's abatement ruling and
dismissed the original merits appeal as moot."
The Supreme Court of Virginia awarded appeals on both is-
sues.94 In its opinion, the supreme court first noted it had given
prior abatement cases disparate treatment and the court then re-
viewed the history of the abatement doctrine.9 The court conclud-
ed the legislature, not the judiciary, was the appropriate entity to
determine the Commonwealth's abatement policy.9" The supreme
court vacated the opinion of the court of appeals that applied the
abatement doctrine but affirmed the dismissal of the merits ap-
peal as moot due to Bevel's death, based on the "specific facts and
procedural posture" of the case.97
2. Assignment of Error
The Supreme Court of Virginia emphasized the importance of
proper assignments of error in a petition for appeal in Davis v.
Commonwealth." Before the Court of Appeals of Virginia, Davis
contended that the trial court had erred in accepting his guilty
plea." After the court of appeals denied his petition, he appealed
90. Id. at 470-71, 717 S.E.2d at 790.
91. Id. at 471-72, 717 S.E.2d at 790.
92. Id. at 472, 717 S.E.2d at 791.
93. Id. at 473-74, 717 S.E.2d at 791-92.
94. Id. at 474, 717 $.E.2d at 792.
95. Id. at 474-78, 717 S.E.2d at 792-94 (citations omitted).
96. Id. at 479-80, 717 S.E.2d at 795. Such legislation was introduced in the Virginia
General Assembly in 2012, but did not pass. See H. JOURNAL, House of Delegates of Va.,
Reg. Sess. - (2012), available at http:/legl.state.va.us/cgi-binllegp5O4.exe?ses=121&typ
=bil&val=hblOll. House Bill 1011 provided that a defendant's criminal conviction would
not abate if he died after he was convicted, but his appeal would be moot if he died while
the appeal was pending. H.B. 1011, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2012).
97. Bevel, 282 Va. at 480-81, 717 S.E.2d at 795-96. The supreme court "expressly" did
not address whether the death of a criminal defendant would always moot a conviction. Id.
at 480, 717 S.E.2d at 795. If a conviction "could have a significant negative impact on a
deceased defendant's estate or the rights of his heirs or another party," a substitute party
could prosecute the appeal, as the English common law permitted. Id., 717 S.E.2d at 796.
98. 282 Va. 339, 339, 717 S.E.2d 796, 796-97 (2011).
99. Id., 717 S.E.2d at 796. Davis pled guilty to violation of Virginia Code section 18.2-
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to the supreme court."' He assigned as error the ruling of the tri-
al court, rather than the holding of the court of appeals, and the
supreme court dismissed his appeal.' Noting that Rule
5:17(c)(1)(iii) of the Rules of the Supreme Court of Virginia pro-
vides that an assignment of error must "address a finding or rul-
ing of a '[t]ribunal from which an appeal is taken""2 and that in-
sufficient assignments of error required dismissal of the petition,
the supreme court stated that sufficient assignments of error in a
petition "is a mandatory procedural requirement."'0 3 Consequent-
ly, "the failure to comply with this requirement deprives this
Court of its active jurisdiction to consider the appeal.'0 4
3. Filing of Transcript
A change in the Rules of the Supreme Court of Virginia con-
cerning motions to extend time for filing transcripts was at issue
in LaCava v. Commonwealth.' Effective July 1, 2010, Rule
5A:8(a) allows a party ninety days from the entry of final judg-
ment within which to file a motion to extend the sixty-day period
within which transcripts pertinent to the appeal may be filed."'
After LaCava was convicted of embezzlement, she filed her notice
of appeal pro se and contacted the court reporter to order tran-
scripts." 7 The court reporter inadvertently misinformed LaCava
that the clerk of court would order and file the transcripts.108
LaCava later obtained appellate counsel, who then learned the
transcripts had not been filed.'0 ' On the eighty-eighth day after
the final judgment had been entered, LaCava's attorney filed a
308.2(A), which prohibits possession of a firearm after having been convicted of a violent
felony within the previous ten years. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 339-40, 717 S.E.2d at 796-97.
102. Id. at 339, 717 S.E.2d at 796 (quoting VA. SUP. CT. R. pt. 5, R. 5:17 (Repl. Vol.
2012)).
103. Id.
104. Id., 717 S.E.2d at 796-97 (citing Smith v. Commonwealth, 281 Va. 464, 467-68,
706 S.E.2d 889, 891-92 (2011); Jay v. Commonwealth, 275 Va. 510, 518-19, 659 S.E.2d
311, 315-16 (2008)).
105. 283 Va. 465, 467, 722 S.E.2d 838, 838 (2012).
106. Id. at 471, 722 S.E.2d at 840-41. The former version of Rule 5A:8(a) provided that
a motion to extend the filing time had to be made within sixty days after entry of the final
judgment. Id., 722 S.E.2d at 841.
107. Id. at 467, 722 S.E.2d at 839.
108. Id. at 467-68, 722 S.E.2d at 839.
109. Id. at 468, 722 S.E.2d at 839.
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motion in the Court of Appeals of Virginia to extend the time for
filing the transcripts.1 1 The court of appeals denied the motion
because LaCava had not shown good cause as to why she had not
requested the extension before the original sixty-day filing period
had expired. 1 ' The court also denied LaCava's petition for appeal,
based on the absence of the transcript."
2
The Supreme Court of Virginia vacated and remanded the de-
cision of the court of appeals."' The supreme court held that noth-
ing in the "plain language of Rule 5A:8(a)" supported the inter-
pretation the court of appeals had given to the rule."' The
supreme court also determined LaCava had established good
cause to extend the filing deadline and directed the court of ap-
peals to consider her petition for appeal on its merits."5
In Belew v. Commonwealth, the Supreme Court of Virginia
held that the Court of Appeals of Virginia erred in not consider-
ing a transcript, which was pertinent to issues raised by the de-
fendant on appeal and which had not been timely filed pursuant
to Rule 5A:8(a), but had been made a part of the appellate record
under Virginia Code section 8.01-428(B) and Rule 5A:9."6 The
court reporter timely filed two of the transcripts pertinent to Be-
lew's appeal but neglected to file the transcript of the actual trial
because the circuit court's case management system showed the
hearing scheduled for that day had been continued."' Belew did
not discover the trial transcript had been omitted until after the
sixty-day deadline for filing had passed."" After the court reporter
filed the transcript, Belew asked the circuit court to make it part
of the record, contending a clerical error had occurred and could
be corrected under section 8.01-428(B). 9 The circuit court grant-
110. Id.
111. Id. at 469, 722 S.E.2d at 839.
112. Id., 722 S.E.2d at 839-40.
113. Id. at 472, 722 S.E.2d at 841.
114. Id. at 471, 722 S.E.2d at 840-41.
115. Id. at 472, 722 S.E.2d at 841,
116. 284 Va. 173, 181, 726 S.E.2d 257, 261 (2012).
117. Id. at 176, 726 S.E.2d at 258-59.
118. Id. at 176-77, 726 S.E.2d at 259.
119. Id. at 176, 726 S.E,2d at 259. Virginia Code section 8.01-428(B) permits a trial
court to correct clerical mistakes in the record "arising from an oversight or from an inad-
vertent omission ... at any time on its own initiative or upon the motion of any party" be-
fore an appeal is docketed in the appellate court. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-428(B) (Repl. Vol.
2007 & Cum. Supp. 2012). After the appeal is docketed, mistakes may be corrected with
leave of the appellate court. Id.
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ed Belew's motion and also ordered the transcript be sent to the
court of appeals.' Subsequently, Belew filed her petition for ap-
peal in the court of appeals which rejected the petition because
the trial transcript had not been timely filed and could not be
considered by the court.'
The supreme court, with three justices dissenting, reversed the
ruling of the court of appeals, holding that the court reporter's
failure to prepare and file the trial transcript was a clerical mis-
take, which the circuit court had authority to correct.122 Thus, the
circuit court also had authority under Rule 5A:9 to make the
transcript a part of the appellate record.'23 The majority rejected
the argument that Belew was required to request an extension of
time from the court of appeals to file the transcript.
124
4. Use of Statement of Facts
In Smith v. Commonwealth, the Court of Appeals of Virginia
held that a rebuttable presumption exists as to whether a state-
ment of facts, prepared in lieu of a transcript in accordance with
Rule 5A:8(c) of the Rules of the Supreme Court of Virginia, is
binding upon the appellate court "as an accurate recitation of the
incidents at trial."'25 Trial counsel prepared the statement of facts
for Smith's appeal, in which he challenged the trial court's ruling
that he had violated the terms of his suspended sentence, but the
circuit court judge who certified the document was not the judge
who had presided at trial.'26 Although properly a part of the ap-
pellate record, the statement of facts was not consistent with oth-
120. Belew, 284 Va. at 176, 726 S.E.2d at 259.
121. Id. at 176-77, 726 S.E.2d at 259.
122. Id. at 181, 726 S.E.2d at 261. The dissent held that Virginia Code section 8.01-
428(B) did not apply because Belew's "inattentiveness" and failure to ask for an extension
of time to rile the transcript under Rule 5A:8(a) were not clerical mistakes that could be
remedied under the statute. Id. at 186, 726 S.E.2d at 264 (Powell, J., dissenting); see VA.
SUP. CT. R. pt. 5A, R. 5A:8 (Repl. Vol. 2012) (granting a party ninety days from the entry
of final judgment to file a motion to extend the sixty-day period for filing a transcript).
123. Belew, 284Va. at 181, 726 S.E.2d at 261.
124. Id.
125. 59 Va. App. 710, 722, 722 S.E.2d 310, 315 (2012); see New Bay Shore Corp. v. Lew-
is, 193 Va. 400, 404, 69 S.E.2d 320, 322 (1952) (holding a trial transcript, certified by a
trial judge, is presumed to be correct, and absent proof to the contrary, is binding on an
appellate court).
126. Smith, 59 Va. App. at 715-16, 721, 722 S.E.2d at 312, 315.
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er parts of the record. '27 The document incorrectly stated Smith
had pled not guilty, while the trial court's order stated he had
pled no contest; the document also made no reference to some of
Smith's prior convictions-those admitted as evidence at the rev-
ocation hearing-but referred to other prior convictions that may
not have been admitted as evidence.128 Given these discrepancies,
the court of appeals concluded that the statement of facts was in-
accurate and thus not binding.2 9 The court then held that Smith's
no contest plea waived his claim on appeal. 13°
5. Preservation of Issues
In Brandon v. Cox, the litigant's failure to obtain a ruling from
the trial court on a motion to reconsider waived her argument on
appeal on the same grounds. 3 ' After the circuit court denied
Brandon's request to obtain a security deposit from her former
landlord, she moved the court to reconsider, but the court did not
rule on the motion."' Brandon appealed to the Supreme Court of
Virginia and filed a statement of facts, which contained little in-
formation about arguments made at trial or the court's ruling and
which made no reference to the motion for reconsideration. 3 The
supreme court held that, because the record did not show the trial
court knew of the motion to reconsider or had an opportunity to
rule on it, Brandon had not properly preserved her argument on
appeal.3 The dissent, however, stated the court should have ap-
plied the ends of justice exception to Rule 5:25 of the Rules of the
Supreme Court of Virginia, even though Brandon had not asked
the court to do so, because Brandon had experienced a "grave in-
justice."''
In Dickerson v. Commonwealth, the Court of Appeals of Virgin-
ia held that Dickerson's closing argument in his bench trial, dur-
127. Id. at 717, 719, 722 S.E.2d at 313-14.
128. Id. at 717, 722 S.E.2d at 313.
129. Id. at 722, 722 S.E.2d at 315.
130. Id. at 724, 722 S.E.2d at 316.
131. 284 Va. 251, 256-57, 726 S.E.2d 298, 301 (2012). Although the case concerns a civ-
il matter, the procedural point addressed is one of first impression and is equally applica-
ble to criminal cases. Id. at 256, 726 S.E.2d at 301.
132. Id. at 254, 726 S.E.2d at 299-300.
133. Id., 726 S.E.2d at 300.
134. Id. at 256-57, 726 S.E.2d at 301.
135. Id. at 257-58 & n.2, 726 S.E.2d at 302 & n.2 (Mims, J., dissenting).
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ing which he asked the judge to believe his testimony over the po-
lice officer's testimony, did not preserve his claim on appeal that
the evidence was legally insufficient to sustain his conviction for
possession of cocaine.' "[W]hen the accused elects to forgo a mo-
tion to strike and proceed directly to closing argument, it is in-
cumbent on him to make the trial court aware that he is challeng-
ing something other than the veracity of the evidence that
supports the Commonwealth's theory."'' 7
In Flanagan v. Commonwealth, the Court of Appeals of Virgin-
ia addressed the effect of a mistrial on preserving issues for ap-
peal.136 Flanagan was convicted of possessing or manufacturing
explosive materials in violation of Virginia Code section 18.2-85.139
His first trial ended in a mistrial, and he was retried six months
later.' Before his first trial, he moved to dismiss the charge on
the basis that section 18.2-85 was void for vagueness, but he did
not renew his motion before the second trial."' When Flanagan
raised the constitutionality of the statute on appeal, the court of
appeals held that he had not preserved the issue because the trial
court's ruling in the case that ended in a mistrial did not carry
over automatically to the later retrial.12 Accordingly, Flanagan
was "required to renew his motion[] with specificity in order to
preserve the record." 43 The court declined to apply either the good
cause or ends of justice exception to Rule 5A:18."' The court of
appeals further determined that Flanagan's motion to set aside
the verdict had not preserved the issue because he filed his mo-
tion more than twenty-one days after the trial court entered the
final order."5
136. 58 Va. App. 351, 358-59, 709 S.E.2d 717, 720 (2011). Dickerson testified he had
not possessed cocaine, while the police officer testified he had discovered cocaine in Dick-
erson's pocket during a search incident to his arrest for public intoxication. Id. at 355, 709
S.E.2d at 718-19.
137. Id. at 357-58, 709 S.E.2d at 720.
138. 58 Va. App. 681, 692-94, 714 S.E.2d 212, 217-18 (2011) (citation omitted).
139. Id. at 688, 714 S.E.2d at 215.
140. Id. at 693, 714 S.E.2d at 217.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 692-93, 714 S.E.2d at 217 (quoting Elliott v. Commonwealth, 267 Va. 396,
428, 593 S.E.2d 270, 290 (2004)).
143. Id. at 693, 714 S.E.2d at 217-18 (quoting Elliott, 267 Va. at 428, 593 S.E.2d at
290) (internal quotation marks omitted).
144. Id. at 694-95, 714 S.E.2d at 218-19.
145. Id. at 694, 714 S.E.2d at 218 (citations omitted).
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6. Review of Sufficiency of Evidence
Under Supreme Court of the United States precedent, an ap-
pellate court, when reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence in a
case, must consider all of the evidence admitted at trial, including
evidence that may have been admitted erroneously.'46 Adhering to
this principle, the Court of Appeals of Virginia rejected the de-
fendant's argument in Rushing v. Commonwealth that the court
should consider only the properly admitted evidence in determin-
ing whether the evidence was sufficient to prove he had partici-
pated in a criminal street gang in violation of Virginia Code sec-
tion 18.2-46.2(A).147 The court of appeals then concluded the
evidence, "viewed in its entirety, amply support[ed]" the verdict.'48
The Supreme Court of Virginia, however, disagreed and re-
versed the ruling of the court of appeals. 9 The supreme court ad-
dressed both the evidentiary and sufficiency questions raised by
Rushing in his appeal, although the court noted the "better appel-
late practice" would identify the "precise error" at issue by sepa-
rately assigning error to the admission of evidence and to the suf-
ficiency of evidence supporting the conviction. 5 ° After determin-
ing the challenged evidence was erroneously admitted,15 ' the court
held such evidence could not be considered in reviewing the suffi-
ciency of the evidence.'52 Citing Crawford v. Commonwealth, 53 the
court stated it had adopted a different standard of appellate re-
view than the one used in Lockhart.' The court thus found the
evidence insufficient to prove Rushing had participated in a crim-
146. See Lockhart v. Nelson, 488 U.S. 33, 41 (1988); see also McDaniel v. Brown, 558
U.S. 120, - 130 S. Ct. 665, 672 (2010) (per curiam).
147. 58 Va. App. 594, 597, 606, 712 S.E.2d 41, 43, 47 (2011). Rushing contended a pho-
tograph of him and prior felony convictions of other gang members were admitted improp-
erly. Id. at 600, 712 S.E.2d at 44. The court of appeals did not address whether the items
were admissible because the court determined that issue was merely a 'subset"' of the suf-
ficiency question. Id. at 602, 712 S.E.2d at 45.
148. Id. at 610, 712 S.E.2d at 49.
149. Rushing v. Commonwealth, 284 Va. 270, 279, 726 S.E.2d 333, 339 (2012).
150. Id. at 277-78, 726 S.E.2d at 338.
151. Id. at 277, 726 S.E.2d at 337-38. The supreme court held the conviction of an al-
leged gang member was not relevant because there was no evidence to show he was actu-
ally a gang member when he committed the offense; the court also found there was no
foundation to admit the photograph of Rushing. Id.
152. Id. at 278, 726 S.E.2d at 338-39.
153. 281Va. 84, 704 S.E.2d 107 (2011).
154. Rushing, 284 Va. at 278, 726 S.E.2d at 339 (referencing Lockhart v. Nelson, 448
U.S. 33 (1988)).
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inal gang because section 18.2-46.2(A) required proof of two pred-
icate crimes by gang members and, excluding the inadmissible ev-
idence of the alleged gang member's conviction, the Common-
wealth had proven only one crime."'
III. CRIMINAL LAW
A. Constitutional Issues
1. Search and Seizure
Under settled Fourth Amendment principles, a police officer
may conduct a brief, investigatory stop of an individual when the
officer has a reasonable, articulable suspicion that criminal activ-
ity is afoot.5 The Fourth Amendment does not require, however,
any level of suspicion to justify consensual encounters between
police and citizens.5 7 In Branham v. Commonwealth, the Su-
preme Court of Virginia addressed these two principles." 8 Shortly
after midnight, officers attempted to serve warrants on Jesse
Ford for cocaine charges.'59 Ford lived in a rural area, about a
quarter of a mile from the public road. 60 As officers drove down
Ford's driveway, they found it blocked by a vehicle occupied by
Branham.' An officer walked to Branham's vehicle and asked to
see his driver's license.'62 An "unusually nervous" Branham com-
plied with the request, and the officer conducted a record check of
the license. 65 The officer noted that Branham lived nearby.'
Branham told the officer he had been "out looking for somebody
up there [but] couldn't find the residence."'6 5 But Branham did not
155. Id. The supreme court did not address whether the erroneous admission of Rush-
ing's photograph affected the verdict. Id. at 278-79, 726 S.E.2d at 339.
156. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968).
157. See United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 200-01 (2002).
158. 283 Va. 273, 280-81, 720 S.E.2d 74, 78 (2012).
159. Id. at 276-77, 720 S.E.2d at 76.
160. Id. (footnote omitted).
161. Id. at 277, 720 S.E.2d at 76.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id. (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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provide the name or address of the person he was trying to lo-
cate.' Branham eventually consented to a search of his person,
which yielded a plastic baggie containing cocaine."'
On appeal, Branham argued the trial court should have sup-
pressed the evidence against him because the search represented
the fruits of an illegal seizure. 6' According to Branham, he was
seized, within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, as soon as
the officer took his driver's license to make a record check.6 ' The
supreme court, however, held the record check of the license was
entirely consensual, noting that the officer's request to see Bran-
ham's license was no more than a request.7 0 The court further
held that "as the chain of events unfolded, [the officer] developed
a reasonable, articulable suspicion that criminal activity was
afoot.' 7 ' The time, place, and manner of the encounter were all
circumstances allowing an officer to reasonably suspect Branham
was not parked in the driveway of a person wanted for cocaine
charges at nearly one in the morning because he was lost.
7 12
In Shifflett v. Commonwealth, the Court of Appeals of Virginia
considered whether a state trooper had reasonable suspicion to
conduct an investigatory stop of a vehicle bearing a "farm use" li-
cense plate.' 73 Around 10:00 p.m. one night in February, after a
recent snowstorm, a state trooper noticed a pickup truck on the
highway with three people in the cab.' 74 The pickup truck had a
store bought "farm use" license plate, rather than an official plate
issued by the Virginia Department of Motor Vehicles for regis-
tered farm use vehicles.'75 Observing that "in the wintertime you
don't see many farm use vehicles on the road," the trooper
stopped the truck to determine if it was, in fact, an unregistered
166. Id.
167. Id. at 277-78, 720 S.E.2d at 76-77. Branham also consented to a search of his ve-
hicle, which uncovered two sets of digital scales containing a white powder residue con-
sistent with cocaine. Id. at 278, 720 S.E.2d at 77.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 280, 720 S.E.2d at 78 (stating that Virginia Code section 46.2-104, which
requires a driver to exhibit his driver's license to an officer for identification, applies only
when a driver has received a signal to stop from a law enforcement officer).
171. Id.
172. See id. at 280-81, 720 S.E.2d at 78.
173. 58 Va. App. 732, 740, 716 S.E.2d 132, 137 (2011).
174. Id. at 734-35, 716 S.E.2d at 134.
175. Id. at 734, 716 S.E.2d at 134 (citation omitted).
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vehicle being used exclusively for farm use.'76 The trooper discov-
ered several empty beer cans and a bottle of whiskey in the truck
and noted the driver, Shifflett, smelled of alcohol, had glassy,
bloodshot eyes, and slurred his speech.'17 As the officer initially
suspected, "[t]he pickup truck was not being used for agricultural
purposes that night."'78
Shifflett entered a conditional guilty plea to driving while in-
toxicated and to operating an unregistered, uninspected, and un-
insured vehicle.'79 On appeal, Shifflett argued the trial court
should have suppressed the evidence of his guilt because the
trooper lacked a reasonable suspicion to stop his "farm use" vehi-
cle. 80 Under Virginia's statutory scheme for vehicle licensing and
registration, a registered farm use vehicle may be used for some
"nonfarm use[s]." '' An unregistered farm use vehicle, on the other
hand, is subject to stricter limitations, and must be "used exclu-
sively for agricultural or horticultural purposes," and, even then,
its use must fit within a limited list of farm-related activities.'
8 2
The court of appeals found "[s]everal circumstances" that created
a reasonable suspicion that Shifflett-traveling "in the dead of
winter" at night after a snowstorm-might not have been using
his unregistered pickup truck consistent with the statutory ex-
emptions for farm use vehicles.'
2. Miranda Rights
Under well-established Fifth Amendment principles, when a
suspect requests an attorney during a custodial interrogation, the
police must immediately stop questioning the suspect.' The sus-
pect, however, must clearly and unambiguously assert his right to
counsel in order to invoke the protections afforded by Miranda
176. Id. at 735, 716 S.E.2d at 134.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 734, 716 S.E.2d at 133.
180. Id., 716 S.E.2d at 133-34.
181. Id. at 737, 716 S.E.2d at 135 (alteration in original) (quoting VA. CODE ANN. §
46.2-698(B)(2) (Repl. Vol. 2010)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
182. Id. at 738, 716 S.E.2d at 135 (quoting VA. CODE ANN. § 46.2-665(A) to (B) (Cum.
Supp. 2012)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
183. Id., 716 S.E.2d at 136.
184. See Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484-85 (1981).
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and Edwards."5 If a suspect makes a reference to an attorney
that is ambiguous or equivocal, an officer may ask clarifying
questions to determine whether the suspect actually wants an at-
torney."6 In Stevens v. Commonwealth, the Supreme Court of Vir-
ginia examined whether the investigating officers should have
stopped questioning the defendant after he made reference to an
attorney during a custodial interrogation.'87
Police arrested Stevens in connection with two murders, ad-
vised him of his Miranda rights, and interrogated him."' The
next day, Stevens was transported for his initial court appearance
where he was to have counsel appointed.89 The magistrate's or-
der, however, sent Stevens to the wrong court on the wrong day.9°
Later that day, the investigating officers brought Stevens in for
more questioning.' At the beginning of the interview, an officer
asked Stevens if he still understood his rights.'92 After Stevens
acknowledged he did, the officer told Stevens he had the right to
have a lawyer present during the interview.' 9 Stevens said,
"That's what I want, a lawyer, man."'94 The officer asked if Ste-
vens now wanted a lawyer, to which Stevens responded, "I mean,
that's what I thought they brought me up here for today."'' 5 The
officer responded, "The question is do you want a lawyer before
you talk to us again or are you willing to talk to us?""' 6 Stevens
agreed to talk to the officers without an attorney.197 Stevens then
made incriminating statements during his interview.198
On appeal, Stevens argued that the statement, "[Tihat's what I
want, a lawyer man," was clear and unambiguous and, therefore,
the words themselves precluded further questioning by the offic-
185. See Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 459-60 (1994) (discussing Edwards, 451
U.S. 477; Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966)).
186. Id. at 461.
187. 283 Va. 296, 302, 720 S.E.2d 80, 82 (2012).
188. Id. at 299, 720 S.E.2d at 81.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 300, 720 S.E.2d at 81.
193. Id.
194. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
195. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
196. Id., 720 S.E.2d at 82 (internal quotation marks omitted).
197. Id.
198. Id. at 301, 720 S.E.2d at 82.
2012]
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
ers.19' The supreme court rejected the notion that the court only
could consider the words spoken and not their context.2°0 The
court observed that whether a suspect has invoked his right to
counsel during a custodial interrogation is an objective inquiry,
and that the request "must be such that 'a reasonable officer in
light of the circumstances' would understand the statement to be
a request to have counsel present for the interrogation." '' The
court found the circumstances preceding Stevens' request for an
attorney could be understood by a reasonable police officer as a
request for either a lawyer during the interrogation or for a law-
yer to represent Stevens in court.22 Therefore, the court held the
officers reasonably could have viewed Stevens' request as ambig-
uous and were permitted to ask clarifying questions.0 3
In Commonwealth v. Quarles, the Supreme Court of Virginia
considered whether police impermissibly engaged the defendant
in interrogation, or its functional equivalent, after he invoked his
right to counsel.0 4 Quarles and an eleven-year-old accomplice de-
cided to "rob a white lady" near Virginia Commonwealth Univer-
sity.0 5 Quarles hit the first woman they encountered in the head
with a brick, and they robbed her.0 6 The police took the pair into
custody and brought them to the precinct.0 7 Detective Alston first
interviewed Quarles' accomplice.2 "8 Afterwards, Officer Papeo told
Detective Alston in the hallway of the station that Quarles
wished to talk to an attorney. 2°9 Detective Alston said, "[T]hat's
fine if he doesn't want to talk to me. I wasn't the person that
robbed a white lady and hit her in the head with a brick."' 0
Quarles, sitting approximately ten to fifteen feet away, overheard
the detective's comment and expressed a desire to speak to him.21 '
199. Id. at 303, 720 S.E.2d at 83 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
200. Id. at 303-04, 720 S.E.2d at 83 (citations omitted).
201. Id. at 304, 720 S.E.2d at 83-84 (quoting Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 459
(1994)).
202. Id. at 305, 720 S.E.2d at 84.
203. Id.
204. 283 Va. 214, 220, 720 S.E.2d 84, 87 (2012).
205. Id. at 217, 720 S.E.2d at 85 (internal quotations omitted).
206. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
207. Id., 720 S.E.2d at 85-86.
208. Id., 720 S.E.2d at 86.
209. Id. at 218, 720 S.E.2d at 86.
210. Id. (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
211. Id.
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Detective Alston responded, "[N]o that's fine, you don't have to
talk to me. I'm good."2 '2 Quarles persisted and later confessed.21
Prior to trial, Quarles moved to suppress his confession on the
grounds that Detective Alston obtained the evidence in violation
of his Miranda rights under the Fifth Amendment."' The circuit
court denied the motion, but the Court of Appeals of Virginia
eventually reversed.21" On appeal to the supreme court, the Com-
monwealth assigned error to the court of appeals' holding that the
police impermissibly interrogated Quarles after he invoked his
right to counsel."6 Applying Supreme Court of the United States
precedent, the supreme court analyzed whether Detective Alston
should have known his statement was "reasonably likely to elicit
an incriminating response" from the defendant. 7 Considering the
content and context of the statement, the court held Detective Al-
ston should not have known Quarles was likely to respond with
incriminating evidence."' For instance, Quarles may have in-
ferred that his accomplice had confessed based on the detective's
use of the term "white lady"; however, the court did not find "such
minor exposure to evidence" reasonably likely to elicit an incrimi-
219nating response.
B. Specific Crimes
1. Aggravated Sexual Battery
In a pair of consolidated cases, Gonzin v. Commonwealth and
Cousins v. Commonwealth, the Court of Appeals of Virginia re-
versed the defendants' convictions for aggravated sexual battery
and remanded for resentencing on the lesser-included offense of
sexual battery.2 Cousins invited the victim, a seventeen-year-old
female, to "come over later" after she finished work at Dairy
212. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. Id. at 219, 720 S.E.2d at 86 (citing Quarles v. Commonwealth, 58 Va. App. 13, 26,
707 S.E.2d 7, 13 (2011)).
216. Id. at 219, 720 S.E.2d at 87.
217. Id. at 222, 720 S.E.2d at 88 (quoting Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 301
(1980)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
218. Id. at 224, 720 S.E.2d at 89.
219. Id. at 223-24, 720 S.E.2d at 89.
220. 59 Va. App. 1, 3-4 & n.2, 716 S.E.2d 466, 467 & n.2 (2011) (citation omitted).
20121
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
Queen.22' After the victim's shift, she went to the address Cousins
provided her, which was Gonzin's trailer.222 At some point, Cous-
ins asked the victim to come into the back bedroom.223 Once in the
bedroom, Gonzin grabbed her arms, while Cousins pulled off her
clothes. 24 The two men then proceeded to sexually abuse her
against her will.22 ' Afterwards, the victim was "really upset" and
had trouble sleeping."' The next day, a Sexual Assault Nurse Ex-
aminer (SANE) nurse examined the victim.27 The SANE nurse
did not discover any bruises or lacerations on the victim.228
Cousins and Gonzin were convicted of aggravated sexual bat-
tery.229 On appeal, the two men did not dispute they sexually
abused the victim "against her will by force, threat or intimida-
tion. '  Rather, they contended the Commonwealth failed to
prove one of the essential elements of the offense-namely, that
the victim suffered "serious bodily or mental injury." '' The Com-
monwealth argued solely that the victim suffered a serious men-
tal injury.2 2 Applying the plain meaning of the word "serious," the
court of appeals found that, in order to elevate misdemeanor sex-
ual battery to felony aggravated sexual battery, the bodily or
mental injury must be "grave" in appearance or "requiring con-
siderable care."' The court of appeals found that the victim in
this case was understandably upset, as any victim of sexual abuse
would be, but held that the Commonwealth failed to establish the
victim's mental injury was particularly grave or treated with con-
siderable care.234 The court suggested, however, that the victim
impact evidence presented at sentencing might have established
a serious mental injury.' But since the Commonwealth did not
221. Id. at 4, 716 S.E.2d at 467 (internal quotation marks omitted).
222. Id., 716 S.E.2d at 467-68.
223. Id., 716 S.E.2d at 468.
224. Id.
225. Id. at 5, 716 S.E.2d at 468 (footnote omitted).
226. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
227. Id. at 5-6, 716 S.E.2d at 468.
228. Id. at 6, 716 S.E.2d at 468.
229. Id., 716 S.E.2d at 469.
230. Id. at 8, 716 S.E.2d at 469.
231. Id. at 6, 716 S.E.2d at 469 (internal quotation marks omitted).
232, Id. at 9, 716 S.E.2d at 470.
233. Id. at 8-9, 716 S.E.2d at 470 (quoting Nolen v. Commonwealth, 53 Va. App. 593,
598, 673 S.E.2d 920, 922 (2009)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
234. Id. at 10, 716 S.E.2d at 471.
235. See id. at 11 & n.7, 716 S.E.2d at 471 & n.7. The court of appeals also provided a
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present that evidence during the guilt phase of trial, the court
could not consider it.
2 3
6
2. Child Neglect
In Carrington v. Commonwealth, the Court of Appeals of Vir-
ginia affirmed a case of child neglect against a mother's boy-
friend.23 ' Carrington lived with his girlfriend and her twelve-
month-old son. '38 One day, Carrington's girlfriend attempted to
give the baby a bottle because he was crying."' When the baby
would not stop crying, Carrington punched the child's left thigh
three times, causing a fracture.24 As a result, Carrington was
convicted of child neglect.24'
The child neglect statute applies to "[a]ny parent, guardian, or
other person responsible for the care of the child.2 42 In Snow v.
Commonwealth, the court of appeals previously held that "one
may become a person 'responsible for the care of a child' by a vol-
untary course of conduct and without explicit parental delegation
of supervisory responsibility or court order. 2 Carrington main-
tained that Snow requires an individual to be left alone with a
child in order to be held responsible for the child, and since the
child's mother was with the child at the time of the incident, Car-
rington was not another person responsible for the care of the
child. 4 The court of appeals declined to read Snow or the child
neglect statute that narrowly.245 The court determined that noth-
ing in the language of the statute says that an individual cannot
have joint responsibility with another individual for the child, or
that an individual cannot be responsible if a parent or guardian is
list of examples of evidence which could support a fact finder's conclusion that a serious
mental injury has occurred. Id. at 11, 716 S.E.2d at 471.
236. Id. at 11-12, 716 S.E.2d at 471.
237. 59 Va. App. 614, 617, 721 S.E.2d 815, 816 (2012).
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. Id. at 617-18, 721 S.E.2d at 816.
241. Id. at 617, 721 S.E.2d at 816.
242. Id. at 620, 721 S.E.2d at 818 (alteration in original) (quoting VA. CODE ANN. §
18.2-371.1(A) (Repl. Vol. 2009)).
243. Id. at 621, 721 S.E.2d at 818 (quoting Snow v. Commonwealth, 33 Va. App. 766,
773, 537 S.E.2d 6, 10 (2000)).
244. Id.
245. Id.
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also present at the time of the child's injury. The court found
Carrington, through his voluntary course of conduct, was a per-
son responsible for care of the child because he held himself out to
be the father of the child, "looked out" for the child, and even
helped feed, bathe, and put the child to sleep.247
3. Driving Under the Influence
To be convicted of driving under the influence ("DUI") of alco-
hol, the defendant must "drive or operate" a motor vehicle.248 In
Enriquez v. Commonwealth, the Supreme Court of Virginia estab-
lished a new bright-line rule to determine whether a person oper-
ates a motor vehicle when sitting behind the driver's seat of a
parked vehicle.249 As a parking attendant attempted to place a
parking ticket under the windshield wiper of an illegally parked
vehicle, the attendant heard the vehicle's radio playing and dis-
covered Enriquez asleep behind the wheel.250 Unable to wake En-
riquez, the parking attendant called the police for help.25' The po-
lice eventually woke Enriquez, administered a field sobriety test,
and arrested him for DUI.2 An officer testified that when he first
approached the vehicle, he could hear the radio playing and "see
the light from the radio area," but he could not recall if the keys
were in the "on" or "off' position of the ignition.
253
In previous DUi cases, the supreme court found the position of
the key in the ignition-whether in the "on" or "off' position-
determinative in deciding whether a defendant "operated" a vehi-
cle. 4 The dissenting opinion in Stevenson v. City of Falls Church
opined that distinction should not make a difference and that a
246. Id.
247. Id. at 621-22, 722 S.E.2d at 818 (internal quotation marks omitted).
248. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-266 (Cum. Supp. 2012).
249. 283 Va. 511, 516, 722 S.E.2d 252, 255 (2012).
250. Id. at 513, 722 S.E.2d at 253.
251. Id.
252. Id. at 514, 722 S.E.2d at 254.
253. Id.
254. Compare Nelson v. Commonwealth, 281 Va. 212, 214, 707 S.E.2d 815, 815-16
(2011) (affirming a DUI conviction when the defendant was in the driver's seat of a parked
vehicle with the radio playing and the ignition key was in an "on or accessory position"),
with Stevenson v. City of Falls Church, 243 Va. 434, 435, 438, 416 S.E.2d 435, 436, 438
(1992) (reversing a DUI conviction when defendant was asleep behind steering wheel of
parked car and the key was in the ignition, but the arresting officer could not recall
whether the key was in the "on" or the "off' position).
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drunk behind the steering wheel of a parked vehicle with the key
in the ignition is in "actual physical control" of the vehicle be-
cause he could immediately place the vehicle in motion and be-
come a menace to the public." ' Reversing course and adopting the
reasoning of the Stevenson dissent, the supreme court in Enriquez
established a bright-line rule that, when an intoxicated person is
seated behind the steering wheel of a motor vehicle on a public
highway with the key in the ignition, he is in actual physical con-
trol of the vehicle and, therefore, guilty of operating the vehicle
under the influence of alcohol."5
4. Gangs
Morris v. Commonwealth involved members of criminal street
gangs, the Bloods and the Crips, working together to carry out
acts of gang violence.5 Morris, a member of a Bloods gang, at-
tended a party with several members of the Crips.5 Morris took
part in a discussion in which the leader of the Crips discussed
"going on gang missions" and attacking people to improve one's
"status in the gang."'259 Morris then participated in these at-
tacks.
Under Virginia Code section 18.2-46.2, an individual is guilty
of criminal street gang participation if that person "actively par-
ticipates in or is a member of a criminal street gang and...
knowingly and willfully participates in any predicate criminal act
committed for the benefit of, at the direction of, or in association
with any criminal street gang.2 5 On appeal to the Court of Ap-
peals of Virginia, Morris asserted that the evidence failed to
prove that he, a Blood, acted "for the benefit of, at the direction of,
or in association with the Crips."2 2 Specifically, Morris asserted
he did not share the Crips' purpose for the attacks: "to gain or
255. Stevenson, 243 Va. at 439-40, 416 S.E.2d at 438-39 (Compton, J., dissenting)
(quoting VA. CODE ANN. § 46.2-100 (1992 Cum. Supp.)).
256. Enriquez, 283 Va. at 516, 722 S.E.2d at 255.
257. 58 Va. App. 744, 746, 716 S.E.2d 139, 139-40 (2011).
258. Id. at 746, 716 S.E.2d at 140.
259. Id. at 746-47, 716 S.E.2d at 140 (internal quotation marks omitted).
260. Id. at 747, 716 S.E.2d at 140 (footnote omitted).
261. Id. at 748-49, 716 S.E.2d at 141 (quoting VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-46.2 (Repl. Vol.
2009)).
262. Id. at 749, 716 S.E.2d at 141.
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improve rank within the Crips." 63 The Court of Appeals of Virgin-
ia held that the statute does not expressly require the defendant
to have the same specific objective of achieving rank within the
gang.264 In this case, it was enough that Morris participated 'in
association with' the Crips gang members when he acted with a
shared intent to attack innocent people." '265 Moreover, since Morris
participated in the planning of these attacks and knew their ob-
jective, the court held that he did not only associate with the
Crips, he also worked for their benefit and at their direction.26
5. Harassing E-Mails and Telephone Calls
The Supreme Court of Virginia decided two cases concerning
whether harassing e-mails and telephone calls were "obscene." In
Barson v. Commonwealth, the court reversed Barson's conviction
of "harassment by computer" in violation of Virginia Code section
18.2-152.7:1.267 Barson sent his estranged wife hundreds of har-
assing e-mails accusing her of sexual promiscuity.2 66 The Court of
Appeals of Virginia initially reversed Barson's conviction on the
grounds that the content of his emails was not "obscene" as that
term had been defined by the court of appeals in Allman v. Com-
monwealth.26 In its en banc decision, however, the court of ap-
peals expressly overruled Allman and adopted a broader defini-
tion of obscenity derived from the dictionary.270 Barson's e-mails
were found obscene within this newly adopted definition.27'
The dispositive question before the supreme court in Barson
was what definition of "obscene" should apply: the statutory defi-
nition found in Virginia Code section 18.2-372 or the dictionary
definition utilized by the court of appeals.272 The supreme court
263. Id. at 750, 716 at 141 (internal quotation marks omitted).
264. Id., 716 S.E.2d at 141.
265. Id.
266. Id. at 751, 716 S.E.2d at 142.
267. 284 Va. 67, 69, 75, 726 S.E.2d 292, 293, 296 (2012) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
268. Id. at 69-70, 726 S.E.2d at 293.
269. Id. at 70, 726 S.E.2d at 293-94 (citing Allman v. Commonwealth, 43 Va. App. 104,
596 S.E.2d 531 (2004)).
270. Id., 726 S.E.2d at 294 (citing Barson v. Commonwealth, 58 Va. App. 451, 461-64,
711 S.E.2d 220, 225-27 (2011)).
271. Id.
272. Id. at 72, 75, 726 S.E.2d at 294, 296.
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held that the statutory definition applies.2 3 Following the Su-
preme Court of the United States decision in Miller v. California,
the General Assembly applied the "Miller test" in enacting a stat-
utory definition of obscenity in section 18.2-372. 27  In Allman, the
court of appeals held that the statutory definition of obscene
found in section 18.2-372 should apply to prosecutions of obscene
telephone calls under section 18.2-427.275 Because the computer
harassment statute contains parallel language to the telephone
harassment statute, the court of appeals later applied that same
definition in a case involving harassment by computer.
7 6
Since the legislature is presumed to be aware of appellate court
decisions, but has not amended the harassment statutes in the
eight years since Allman utilized the statutory definition of ob-
scene, the supreme court found the legislature acquiesced in its
usage.277 The court went on to hold that as "offensive, vulgar, and
disgusting" as the language of Barson's emails to his wife may
have been, the language did not meet the standard of obscenity
provided by section 18.2-372.7 s
In Rives v. Commonwealth, the Supreme Court of Virginia
made clear that the legal definition of obscene is not applicable in
all cases involving harassment by telephone or computer.2 79 Rives
273. Id. at 75, 726 S.E.2d at 296.
274. Id. at 72, 726 S.E.2d at 294-95 (citing Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973)).
The Miller test definition of obscenity contains three parts: (i) considered as a whole, the
material has as its dominant theme or purpose an appeal to the prurient interest in sex,
that is, a shameful or morbid interest in nudity, sexual conduct, sexual excitement, excre-
tory functions or products thereof or sadomasochistic abuse, (ii) the material goes substan-
tially beyond the customary limits of candor in description or representation of such mat-
ter, (iii) and the material taken as a whole, does not have serious literary, artistic, political
or scientific value. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-372 (Repl. Vol. 2009).
275. Barson, 284 Va. at 72-73, 726 S.E.2d at 295 (citing Allman v. Commonwealth, 43
Va. App. 104, 109, 596 S.E.2d 531, 534 (2007)).
276. Id. at 73, 726 S.E.2d at 295 (citing Airhart v. Commonwealth, No. 1219-05-2, 2007
Va. App. LEXIS 11, at *1 2 (Ct. App. Jan. 16, 2007)).
277. Id. at 74, 726 S.E.2d at 296.
278. Id. at 75, 726 S.E.2d at 296. While the concurring opinion did not consider the
Miller test to be constitutionally mandated when applied to statutes regulating harassing
conduct, rather than speech protected by the First Amendment, the concurring opinion
agreed with the majority's reasoning that the General Assembly tacitly approved of the
Allman decision by leaving the relevant statutes unchanged for eight years. Id. at 77, 726
S.E.2d at 297-98. (Russell, J., concurring). The concurring opinion also viewed Barson's
conviction under a broader standard of obscenity to be a retroactive criminalization of his
conduct in violation of his constitutional right to due process. Id. at 79, 726 S.E.2d at 298.
279. 284 Va. 1, 2-4, 726 S.E.2d 248, 250 (2012). Even though Rives concerned the tele-
phone harassment statute, the analysis would be the same under the parallel computer
harassment statute. See VA. CODE ANN. §§ 18.2-427, -152.7:1 (Cum. Supp. 2012).
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used "angry, vulgar, and threatening language" in a series of tel-
ephone messages left for the victim."28 The Court of Appeals of
Virginia affirmed Rives' conviction of harassment by telephone
under the Miller test for obscenity.81 The supreme court took a
different route in affirming the conviction.2 2
The supreme court observed that Virginia Code section 18.2-
427 proscribes "three separate species of conduct" in the use of
telephone and radio communication, which are intended to coerce,
intimidate or harass: "(1) obscene language, (2) obscene sugges-
tions or proposals, and (3) threats of illegal or immoral acts." '283 As
the court pointed out, the first two of these offenses are qualified
by the word "obscene," but the last is not so limited.""2 4 The court
concluded that "whether language used in telephonic communica-
tions is obscene is immaterial in cases involving threats to com-
mit illegal or immoral acts, where the threat is made with the in-
tent to coerce, intimidate or harass any person.""2 Applying the
"right result for the wrong reason" doctrine, the court held that
Rives' language was sufficient to enable a fact finder to conclude
he threatened the victim with physical injury in the form of a
sexual offense.8 6
6. Larceny
The issue in Little v. Commonwealth arose out of the criminal
activity of a high school teacher and one of his students.8 7 The
student-teacher relationship evolved into criminal activity when
the student involved Little, the teacher, in a plan to break into
280. Rives, 284 Va. at 1, 726 S.E.2d at 249.
281. Id. at 2, 726 S.E.2d at 249.
282. Id., 726 S.E.2d at 250.
283. Id. at 3, 726 S.E.2d at 250 (quoting VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-427 (Cum. Supp. 2011)).
284. Id.
285. Id. at 4, 726 S.E.2d at 250.
286. Id. at 2-4, 726 S.E.2d at 250 (citing Perry v. Commonwealth, 280 Va. 572, 579,
701 S.E.2d 431, 435-36 (2010)). The supreme court found the "right result for the wrong
reason" doctrine applicable because the case went to trial on stipulated facts, because the
record fully supported the reasoning the court adopted, and because Rives was on notice at
trial that he was charged with violating Virginia Code section 18.2-427. Id. at 3, 726,
S.E.2d at 250. Two justices dissented from the holding, opining that it was inappropriate
to apply the doctrine because Rives was not on notice to present evidence to rebut the
charge of "threaten[ing] any illegal or immoral act" with the intent to harass. Id. at 5, 726
S.E.2d at 251 (Kinser, J., dissenting) (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
287. 59 Va. App. 725, 728, 722 S.E.2d 317, 318 (2012).
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cell phone retail stores, steal the display phones, and sell them."'
Because the student did not have a driver's license, Little agreed
to drive him to the stores. 2"9 Little then drove the student to and
from two AT&T stores, where the student smashed a brick
through the storefront windows, entered the stores, and stole dis-
play phones.29
The issue on appeal to the Court of Appeals of Virginia was
whether the value of the stolen goods exceeded the $200 mini-
mum to elevate Little's larceny conviction to grand larceny.291 Or-
dinarily, the value of stolen property is its market value, particu-
larly, its retail value. 92 In this case, however, the stolen phones
were display models, which had no clear market value." 3 The
court of appeals noted that in Baylor v. Commonwealth, it held
that "where an item had no market value, the actual value [of the
iteml must be shown" to meet the statutory threshold. 4 The
court previously noted that "stolen property may be of such a
character or recent manufacture that replacement value accu-
rately reflects actual or fair market value.""29 In Little, because it
was a reasonable inference that the display phones were new
models in good working condition, the court found the evidence of
their replacement value closely approximated their actual val-
ue.296 The court affirmed the conviction based on evidence that the
cost to replace the phones well exceeded the statutory amount to
elevate the offense to grand larceny.29
288. Id.
289. Id.
290. Id.
291. Id. at 730, 722 S.E.2d at 319. Little was convicted of receiving stolen property in
violation of Virginia Code section 18.2-108, which must be read in connection with Virgin-
ia Code sections 18.2-95 and 18.2-96 to determine the degree of larceny. Id.
292. Id. at 731, 722 S.E.2d at 320 (quoting Robinson v. Commonwealth, 258 Va. 3, 5-6,
516 S.E.2d 475, 476 (1999)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
293. Id.
294. Id. at 732, 722 S.E.2d at 320 (quoting Baylor v. Commonwealth, 55 Va. App. 82,
84-85, 683 S.E.2d 843, 844 (2009)).
295. ld. at 732-33, 722 S.E.2d at 320 (quoting Baylor, 55 Va. App. at 89- 90, 683
S.E.2d at 846).
296. Id. at 733, 722 S.E.2d at 321.
297. Id.
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7. Malicious Wounding
The malicious wounding statute makes it a crime to "malicious-
ly shoot, stab, cut, or wound any person or by any means cause
him bodily injury, with the intent to maim, disfigure, disable, or
kill."'298 In English v. Commonwealth, the Court of Appeals of Vir-
ginia addressed the scope of "bodily injury" required to sustain a
conviction under the statute.2 9 English viciously beat the female
victim, causing her intense pain and leaving her barely able to
move."'0 Months after the attack, the victim continued to need
medical treatment for her nerve damage and severe back pain." '
On appeal, English challenged the sufficiency of the evidence to
convict him of maliciously causing bodily injury in violation of
Virginia Code section 18.2-51.302 The court of appeals commented
that the malicious wounding label to section 18.2-51 is misleading
because the statute includes several other acts besides malicious
wounding."3 "Even if a victim is not shot, stabbed, cut, or wound-
ed, a defendant still violates the statute if he 'by any means'
causes the victim 'bodily injury.""'30 To prove bodily injury, the
court held that the victim need not experience any observable
wounds, cuts, or broken skin; nor must the victim offer proof of
broken bones or bruises. 5 The court concluded that internal bodi-
ly injuries-no less than external injuries-fall within the scope
of the malicious wounding statute.0 6 The court rejected English's
argument that expert medical testimony was necessary to prove
the victim's injuries.0 ' The victim's testimony about her injuries
was more than sufficient to find that English's beating caused her
bodily injury.0
298. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-51 (Repl. Vol. 2009).
299. 58 Va. App. 711, 719, 715 S.E.2d 391, 395 (2011) (citations omitted).
300. Id. at 715-16, 715 S.E.2d at 393.
301. Id. at 716, 715 S.E.2d at 394.
302. Id. at 715, 715 S.E.2d at 393.
303. Id. at 718, 715 S.E.2d at 394.
304. Id. (citing Dawkins v. Commonwealth, 186 Va. 55, 64, 41 S.E.2d 500, 505 (1997)).
305. Id. at 719, 715 S.E.2d at 395 (quoting Luck v. Commonwealth, 32 Va. App. 827,
831-32, 531 S.E.2d 41, 43 (2000) (footnote omitted).
306. Id.
307. Id. at 720-21, 715 S.E.2d at 395-96.
308. Id. at 719-20, 715 S.E.2d at 395.
[Vol. 47:143
CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE
8. Possession of Controlled Substances
In Sierra v. Commonwealth, the Court of Appeals of Virginia
interpreted the mens rea requirement of the statute prohibiting
possession of a controlled substance, Virginia Code section 18.2-
250."' During a search incident to arrest, police found eight pre-
scription pills in Sierra's pockets. 1 Two of these pills contained
methylphenidate, a controlled substance. 1 ' Sierra testified that
he asked an individual for some Tylenol or aspirin for back
pain."2 Sierra claimed he did not know the pills he received were
Concerta, a brand name of methylphenidate."' The trial court ex-
pressly found Sierra's explanation not credible because the pills
were obviously some sort of controlled substance.34
The court of appeals examined whether a defendant has to
know the exact substance he is possessing to be convicted under
section 18.2-250."5 The court found the statute's plain language
indicates that the legislature intended to criminalize the knowing
and intentional possession of "a controlled substance," whatever
that controlled substance may be.316 Therefore, the court declined
to add any other specific mens rea requirement to the statute.3 '
The court held that a defendant need know only that he is pos-
sessing a controlled substance to be guilty of violating the stat-
ute."'1 Because the trial court had discretion to disbelieve Sierra's
testimony that he thought the pills were aspirin or Tylenol, and
because under these facts, the pills obviously were some kind of
controlled substance, the conviction was affirmed."'6
309. 59 Va. App. 770, 776, 722 S.E.2d 656, 659 (2012).
310. Id. at 774, 722 S.E.2d at 658.
311. Id. (citing VA. CODEANN. § 54.1-3447) (Repl. Vol. 2009)).
312. Id.
313. Id.
314. Id. at 775, 722 S.E.2d at 658.
315. Id.
316. Id. at 778, 722 S.E.2d at 659-60 (internal quotation marks omitted).
317. Id., 722 S.E.2d at 660.
318. Id. at 783, 722 S.E.2d at 662.
319. Id. at 784, 722 S.E.2d at 663.
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IV. LEGISLATION
A. Crimes Against Children
An adult who commits the crimes of rape, forcible sodomy, or
object penetration against a child under the age of thirteen now
faces a mandatory minimum sentence of life in prison.320 The 2012
Virginia General Assembly also made it a class six felony to dis-
play child pornography or a "grooming video or materials" to a
child under the age of thirteen with the intent to entice, solicit, or
encourage the child to engage in various sexual acts.32' The term
"grooming video or materials" is defined as a cartoon, animation,
image, or series of images depicting a child engaged in various
sexual acts.322
In response to the child sexual abuse scandal at Pennsylvania
State University, the General Assembly sought to strengthen its
mandatory child abuse reporting laws.323 Athletic coaches, direc-
tors, employees, and volunteers of sports organizations were add-
ed to the list of individuals required to report suspected child
abuse or neglect to the Virginia Department of Social Services,324
as were administers and employees of day camps, youth centers,
and youth recreation programs,323 and employees of public or pri-
vate institutions of higher learning.326 The mandatory reporting
time was lowered from seventy-two hours to "as soon as possible,
but no longer than 24 hours after having reason to suspect a re-
portable offense of child abuse or neglect. 3 27 In addition to in-
creased fines for failing to report suspected child abuse or neglect,
a person who knowingly and intentionally fails to report acts of
320. Act of Apr. 4, 2012, ch. 605, 2012 Va. Acts (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. §§ 18.2-61, -67.1.2, -67.2 (Cum. Supp. 2012)).
321. Act of Apr. 5, 2012, ch. 624, 2012 Va. Acts - (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 18.2-374.4 (Cum. Supp. 2012)).
322. Id.
323. Kathy Adams, Va. Legislators Seek Penalty for Silence with Stronger Laws on Re-
porting Child Abuse, VIRGINIAN-PILOT, Feb. 2, 2012, at Al.
324. Act of Mar. 30, 2012, ch. 391, 2012 Va. Acts - (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 63.2-1509 (Cum. Supp. 2012)).
325. Id.
326. Act of Apr. 18, 2012, ch. 815, 2012 Va. Acts - (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 63.2-1509 (Cum. Supp. 2012)).
327. Act of Apr. 9, 2012, ch. 728, 2012 Va. Acts _ (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 63.2-1509 (Cum. Supp. 2012)).
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rape, sodomy, or object sexual penetration of children "shall be
guilty of a Class 1 misdemeanor. 325
B. Ignition Interlock Systems for First Time DUI Offenders
An ignition interlock system is a device that attaches to a vehi-
cle's ignition and measures a driver's blood alcohol content before
the vehicle can start.329 As a condition of a restricted license, first
time DUI offenders now are prohibited from operating a motor
vehicle without an ignition interlock system.33 °
C. Mandatory Time for Repeat Drug Trafficking Offenses
An offender who commits a second offense of possession with
intent to distribute controlled substances in violation of Virginia
Code section 18.2-248 now will have to serve a mandatory mini-
mum sentence of at least three years.3 ' The mandatory minimum
sentence for a third or subsequent offense was increased from five
332years to ten years.
D. New Jury for Sentencing
In criminal cases, if a jury cannot agree on a punishment, the
trial court must now "impanel a different jury to ascertain pun-
ishment." '33 3 If, however, the defendant, the attorney for the
Commonwealth, and the court agree, the court must fix the pun-
ishment.34
E. Search Warrant for GPS Tracking Device
In the wake of the Supreme Court of the United States decision
in United States v. Jones, which held that police installation of a
328. Id.
329. Act of Mar. 7, 2012, ch. 141, 2012 Va. Acts __ (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. §§ 18.2-270.1, -271.1 (Cum. Supp. 2012)).
330. Id.
331. Act of Apr. 9, 2012, ch. 710, 2012 Va. Acts - (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 18.2-248 (Cum. Supp. 2012)).
332. Id.
333. Act of Mar. 7, 2012, ch. 134, 2012 Va. Acts - (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 19.2-295.1 (Cum. Supp. 2012)).
334. Id.
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GPS tracking device on a suspect's vehicle constituted a search
under the Fourth Amendment, the 2012 Virginia General Assem-
bly codified a procedure by which law enforcement officers may
obtain a search warrant to install a tracking device on a suspect's
vehicle.33 A law enforcement officer may apply for a search war-
rant to permit the use of a tracking device from a judicial officer
located in the jurisdiction where the tracking device is to be in-
stalled, or located in the jurisdiction where there is probable
cause to believe the crime has been, is being, or will be commit-
ted."' The warrant will issue upon a showing of probable cause
and will authorize the use of the tracking device for up to thirty
days; the court must seal the search warrant, affidavit, return,
and any related pleadings; for good cause shown, the court may
grant extensions for use of the tracking device, not to exceed thir-
ty days each; and the installation of the tracking device must be
accomplished within fifteen days of the issuance of the warrant.
Within ten days after the use of the tracking device has ended, of-
ficers must remove it from the property being tracked, return the
warrant to the issuing judge, and serve a copy of the warrant on
the person who was tracked and the person whose property was
tracked."'
F. Strangulation
The 2012 Virginia General Assembly created the new crime of
strangulation, a class six felony." Strangulation is committed by
a person who: (i) without consent; (ii) impedes the blood circula-
tion or respiration of another person; (iii) by knowingly, inten-
tionally, and unlawfully applying pressure to the neck of such
person; (iv) resulting in wounding or bodily injury to such per-
son.3
40
335. See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S ..... 132 S. Ct. 945, 949 (2012) (footnote
omitted); Act of Apr. 5, 2012, ch. 636, 2012 Va. Acts - (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 19.2-56.2 (Cum. Supp. 2012)).
336. Act of Apr. 5, 2012, ch. 636, 2012 Va. Acts - (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 19.2-56.2 (Cum. Supp. 2012)).
337. Id.
338. Id.
339. Act of Apr. 4, 2012, ch. 602, 2012 Va. Acts - (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 18.2-51.6 (Cum. Supp. 2012)).
340. Id.
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